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G E ND ER E QU A L I TY , FA M I LY LAW A ND
A C C E SS TO J U STI CE
M ARY JA N E M OSS M A N*

A BSTR A CT

This article focuses on recent issues in Canada concerning (in)equality of access
to justice in family law matters on the basis of gender. Citing a recent report
of the Canadian Bar Association's Task Force on Gender Equality which
identified problems, especially in legal aid funding, for family law clients, the
paper suggests that the Task Force's conclusions about gender inequality in
legally- aided family law matters are closely related to other issues about
gender and legal aid: the ongoing controversy about the appropriateness of
student legal aid clinics which have adopted policies of representation for
battered women, but not for alleged batterers; and a current issue in Ontario
about the need for a 'woman only' family law clinic service. The article
suggests that these issues need to be examined in light of basic principles
about legal aid funding: the reality of 'neutrality' in gender-neutral categories
of entitlement; the 'public/ private' dichotomy created by well-funded legal
aid services for criminal law matters ('public') and inadequate funding for
family law matters ('private'); and the impact of constitutional guarantees of
equality in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As well, the paper
suggests a need for 'revisioning' access to justice which promotes gender
equality. While the paper focuses on recent issues in Canada, it illustrates
approaches

to problems

of gender and access to justice which are

international, particularly in the context of down- turns in national and
international economies.

1.

I N TR O D U CTI O N

The low status of family law pervades all facets of our justice system and is
reflected in a lack of public resources devoted to resolving conflicts in this
critical area. This low status is rooted in the gender-related approach of our
legal system . . . Flowing from the gender bias in our justice system is the
devaluation of family matters as being essentially private and therefore outside
the realm of the 'real law'.1

These assertions about gender inequality in family law matters were
made in a 1993 report sponsored by the Canadian Bar Association. The
main focus of the CBA report was an assessment of gender equality in
the legal profession in Canada, with recommendations for 'fundamental
change'.2 The report reviewed the problem of gender inequality in the
legal profession in a variety of contexts: law schools and bar admission
programmes; private practice firms, government legal departments and
corporate settings; courts and tribunals; and law societies and the
Canadian Bar Association itself.3 Having identified the nature and
scale of the problems of gender inequality, the report set out a
framework for understanding equality and discrimination in Canadian
law4 and the factors which should motivate the legal profession to
change. According to the report, change is mandated because:

- gender equality is a fundamental legal norm;
- gender equality is a matter of ethics and justice;
- gender equality in the legal profession represents enlightened selfinterest and accountability within a self-regulating profession; and
- gender equality for lawyers is in the public interest.5
Significantly, in the context of this report devoted to gender equality
in the legal profession, the Task Force devoted a full chapter to assessing
the practice of family law in Canada as 'a case study'.6 Commenting
on the number of submissions received from judges, law teachers and
practitioners (both in private practice firms and in government)
expressing concerns about the practice of family law, the Task Force
report explained that its review of family law also permitted an
assessment of the degree to which the justice system 'reflected the
priorities and values of Canadian society'. Thus, the report noted the oft
expressed commitments of federal and provincial governments in
Canada sup- porting family life, legislative enactments designed to
protect family members, and legal aid schemes created to ensure
access to justice in family matters. For the Task Force, the case study
of family law was an opportunity to ask searching questions about
the reality of these commitments:
Are these endeavours backed up by practical commitments? Are the lofty
phrases of our legislators reflected in the concrete experiences of our family
lawyers and litigants? In reviewing the evidence about the practice of family

law in Canada, the Task Force found that the reality fell far short of our
aspirations and our ideals. Lawyers struggling to provide justice to litigants in
this area received little support despite verbal assurances from many levels of
government. In the cynical words of one female lawyer, governments provide
'all possible aid short of actual help'. 7

Thus, according to the Task Force report, the family law context and
the situation of female lawyers in this area of practice represented 'a
good case study of the impact of gender inequality on the justice
system'.8
The report's case study on family law identified a number of features
which contribute to the disparity between law's stated commitments to
family matters and the reality of family law in practice. Central to the
problem, according to the report, is the lack of resources available in
family law matters. This scarcity of resources is evident in the shortage
of vital financial and judicial resources in the justice system for family
law dispute resolution, as well as in the absence of sufficient legal aid
resources for family law clients. As well, the relatively low status
accorded to the practice of family law limits the career options of family
lawyers, a disproportionate number of whom are women lawyers in
Canada.
In this way, the report suggests that the gender inequality of women

in the legal profession intersects with the gender inequity of the justice
system in family law; although women who practise as family lawyers
may

be relatively

better-paid than

their female clients, their

circumstances are, relative to men who are lawyers, frequently
unsatisfactory. 9 As the report explained, 'it is very difficult [for lawyers
practising family law] to be in a position where partners feel you are
billing far too little, and clients feel you are billing far too much', 10
and where 'negative comments and outright contempt' make law
practice unpleasant. Since a disproportionately high number of
Canadian family lawyers are women, gender inequality in family law
matters contributes directly to gender inequality within the legal
profession.
The CBA report's 'case study' on family law thus raises important
equality issues for both family law practitioners and the legal profession
as a whole. For those involved in family law practice, the report reinforces

Michael

Freeman's

assertion

that

'lawyers who remain

technicians cannot contribute to the . . . debate currently raging about
the family'.11 For the legal profession more generally, the issues also
raise profound questions about the administration of justice, questions
which are increasingly being raised in Canada in the context of
challenges about legal aid funding in family law matters. As needs
for legal aid funding have intensified on one hand, and governmental
resources have declined in the current economic circumstances in
Canada on the other,12 challenges about the allocation of scarce legal
aid resources (especially for women claimants involved in family law
disputes) have become more frequent and more bitterly debated

among lawyers. In this context, the CBA report's case study on family
law presents a challenge to the legal profession as a whole.
This paper reviews the report's consideration of legal aid funding
in family law and its recommendations, having regard to some recent
challenges in Ontario concerning gendered legal aid services in the
family law context. It addresses these issues about gender equality in
legal aid services by rethinking some of the fundamental assumptions
of legal aid services in Canada, and the ways in which such assumptions
may reinforce, rather than eliminate, gender inequality for legal aid
claimants. While the focus of the analysis is family law and legal aid
services in the Canadian context, the issues are similar for a number of
other jurisdictions where recent governmental policies (as in the United
Kingdom) may exacerbate the problem of gender and unequal access
to justice in relation to family law.13

2.

G E N D E R E QUA LITY C H A L LE N G ES T O L E G A L A ID SER V I C ES

IN FA M I LY LAW

The CBA report characterized inadequate resources in relation to legal
aid services as 'systemic injustice' for family law clients (and their
lawyers). According to the report, the Task Force received an 'outpouring of frustration' in submissions about the funding of family legal aid
in general and the 'gross discrepancy between the greater resources
allocated to criminal legal aid and the much smaller amount available

for family legal aid'.14 Concerns were expressed about tariff levels for
family law cases, the absence of funding for special disbursements
(including expert witnesses), 15 and the emphasis in family law tariffs on
litigation and court appearances rather than research, mediation and
negotiation, even if the latter were successful. 16
Moreover, many lawyers asserted that 'they simply could not afford
to take legal aid certificates' or that their firms would not permit them
to do so. According to the report, the Task Force heard an 'oft-repeated
remark' from family lawyers that it was cheaper for family lawyers to
work pro bono than on legal aid funding, thus avoiding the paperwork
required by legal aid programmes. More pointedly, family lawyers drew
the Task Force's attention to the disparity in resources available to legal
aid clients for criminal law matters, by contrast with those for family
law clients:
Why does criminal legal aid pay so very well financially while doing family legal
aid is a positive drain on your bank account? In British Columbia one day in
criminal court pays $1600.00 whereas one day in family court pays $400.00.
This seems to be a form of systemic discrimination calculated to lure good
family lawyers into lucrative criminal practice. Where are our 'family values'?
There seems to be an ironic contrast between the verbal focus on family values
and the tangible support given to criminal matters.17

Responding to these concerns, the Task Force recommended that federal
and provincial Governments 'ensure that adequate legal aid funding for

family law cases' be guaranteed across Canada and that the federal
Government 'establish a national civil legal aid tariff' .18
As the Task Force report noted, its review of family law represented
'only a beginning'. Moreover, its recommendations need to be
considered in light of evolving constitutional jurisprudence about
equality in Canada, 19 a context in which claims have been defined by
the Supreme
Court of Canada on the basis of not just 'formal' but also 'substantive'
equality goals for those who are most disadvantaged in Canadian society .20 Thus, while the report's recommendations concerning greater
levels of funding in family law cases are clearly desirable, a more probing
analysis may be needed to accomplish these objectives effectively. This
conclusion is reinforced, moreover, by taking account of recent disputes
about legal aid services for women seeking assistance in the context of
family violence.
The best-known of these disputes involved the decision of a student
legal aid clinic at the University of Ottawa to provide legal assistance
to women who had experienced violence from family partners, and to
deny service to alleged male batterers in cases of domestic violence.
As Jennie Abell has argued, the controversy about this decision raised
significant philosophical and political issues about equality in the legal
process, although the form of the debate which resulted from the clinic's
decision generally failed to address them, focusing instead on issues

about decision-making powers within the profession and on process and
procedures. 21 Although some of the 'facts' of the dispute remain hotly
contested, it seems clear that there was an agreement in principle that
the clinic would not simply turn away male batterers seeking legal
advice and representation; instead, the clinic seems to have intended to
refer such applicants to the local legal aid programme for assistance,
and it is at least arguable that they would have received representation
from lawyers on the basis of legal aid certificates, or at the very least
duty counsel services.22
Whether or not the clinic's referral policy was ever fully delineated
or effectively implemented, however, the local Bar (and especially
members of the criminal defence Bar) immediately expressed outrage
about the decision, calling for the suspension of governmental funding
of the student legal aid clinic and then laying a formal complaint,
based on sex discrimination, with Ontario's Law Society in 1990.23
Eventually, a formal hearing was conducted and various efforts to
achieve compromise through negotiation occurred, although the issue
has continued to resurface in other contexts.
Especially for the Law Society, these issues of gender and legal aid
services remain controversial, and proposals to establish specialized
legal aid services for women continue to meet criticisms based on sex
discrimination. Thus, in the fall of 1993, the Law Society rejected a
governmental proposal to establish a women-only family law clinic, once

again on the basis that it would be 'discriminatory'. According to press
reports of the decision, the Law Society objected to the creation of such
a clinic on the grounds that no case had been established showing that
a clinic 'offering these broad services is driven by an access need peculiar
to women'.24 Such comments suggest that the issue about women's
access to legal aid services in family law, especially in cases of
domestic violence, remains somewhat misunderstood as well as
seriously contested at the present time.25
According to Abell, the debate about the policy adopted by the
Ottawa student legal aid clinic showed that those opposed to the
decision failed to understand the Supreme Court's decision about
equal- ity in 1989 in Andrews, and the need to take account of
substantive inequality based on societal disadvantage, not just the
'sameness' standard of formal equality:26
Detractors of the policy charged that it was discriminatory, simply because
the clinic proposed to treat men differently from women. Their argument
ignores the contextualized legal meaning of equality elaborated in recent
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. Thus, it is problematic even at the
level of strict legal analysis. [According to Andrews], not every distinction
between individuals and groups will give rise to a violation of section 15 of
the Charter. Instead, it is clear that the promotion of equality contemplated by
that section goes beyond the mere elimination of distinctions in treatment to a

consideration of situation and impact.27

In light of the Supreme Court jurisprudence, it was thus possible to
see the student clinic's policy as one which 'adverted to the special
needs of women in dealing with the legal system, the serious social
problem of violence against women, and the fact that many women
have

gone without

representation

in dealing with

the legal

consequences of violence'.28 Moreover, for the clinic's services to be
effective in this role, the students saw their policy as necessary 'both to
avoid potential conflicts
of interest and to enhance their credibility in women's eyes'.29
Thus, these continuing challenges to the development of legal aid
services expressly designed to meet women' s needs in family matters
raise important and controversial issues about the meaning of gender
· equality in the Canadian legal aid system. Moreover, while the
recommendations of the CBA report affirm the need for action in
relation to more comprehensive legal aid services in family law, these
recent controversies about legal aid services for women clearly
demonstrate that fundamental issues remain contested among members
of the legal profession. Since these issues also continue to impede
reform efforts designed to respond more effectively to the needs of
women claimants for legal aid services in family law matters, a more
fundamental assessment of gender equality and access to justice in the
family law context is needed.

3.

G E N D E R E QUA L ITY , FA MILY L AW A N D A CCESS T

O J U STIC E: FU N DA M E N TA L P R I N C I P LES

As Deborah Rhode has suggested in relation to issues of justice and
gender in the United States, 'significant progress toward gender
equality
will require . . . substantial changes in our legal paradigms and social
priorities' .30 Similarly, in thinking about the issue of legal aid services
for women in family law cases in Canada, it is necessary to rethink some
fundamental principles, both about legal aid services and about gender
equality in the family law context. This paper explores some of these
more fundamental principles by challenging the 'neutrality' of current
categories of entitlement to legal aid services and by demonstrating how
they replicate the public/private dichotomy so frequently used to deny
legal equality to women. As well, the paper focuses on equality
jurisprudence in Canada, especially in relation to gender issues, and
raises

questions

about

its

potential

for

challenging

current

arrangements for legal aid services. In doing so, the paper also
envisages the need to transform law and legal processes so as to
achieve justice for women in the family law context, an objective
characterized by Rhode as one of 'broadening our aspirations to
justice'. 31
A. Neutrality

Legal aid services are provided in Canada (as elsewhere) on the basis
of 'categorical entitlement'; that is, defined categories of legal services
are offered, either on a mandatory or discretionary basis, to those who
meet the programme's eligibility guidelines.32 On its face, a 'categorical
entitlement' programme is gender neutral and non-discriminatory,
merely defining the categories of legal services to which eligible claimants are entitled. For those involved in assessing the law's responsiveness
to women's claims, however, such gender neutral categories may be
inherently suspect as 'artificial classifications', because women were not
involved in defining them, because women's interests may have been
less valued or understood in the process of defining categories, or
because legal aid programmes have replicated categories from the legal
system which have not taken women's experiences into account.33 For
these reasons, a categorical scheme of entitlement to legal aid services
may mean that, in practice, women's needs are less well served than
those of men.
There is some data that the use of these 'neutral' categories for
entitlement to legal aid services in Canada has resulted in a
disproportionate amount of legal aid services for male rather than
female claimants. Thus, for example, a 1992 report in Ontario
concluded that 'the legal aid budget [in Ontario] is unequally
distributed and favours men's legal problems, primarily criminal, over
women's legal problems, primarily matrimonial' .34 This evidence that

men are more often entitled to legal aid services, by contrast with
women, raises important questions about the substantive 'neutrality' of
legal aid guidelines in practice, 35 suggesting that gender-neutral
language may, in fact, 'mask' hidden and gendered preferences for
those legal aid services more frequently required by men. Moreover,
especially in a context of diminishing state
resources for legal aid services, statutory distinctions between services
which are 'mandatory' and those which are regarded as 'discretionary'
(distinctions which may also be phrased in gender neutral language)
may result in practice in disproportionate resources for men who are
legal aid claimants.
In this context, moreover, the significant amount of data in Canada
about the relative poverty of women, by contrast with men, creates an
urgent need to question the substantive 'neutrality' of legal aid services
which are provided less frequently in practice to women claimants.36
Indeed, the disproportionate amount of poverty among women, by
contrast with

men,

suggests

that

gender-neutral

categories

of

entitlement may confirm, as Martha Fineman has suggested, that
'what is is as "biased" as that which challenges it'.37 Such an assertion
is similarly reflected in Richard Abel's conclusion that serious
scholarship about legal aid services must take account of its 'inherently
political nature'.38 Thus, in the context of women's greater relative
poverty, 'neutral' categories of entitlement to legal aid services must be

assessed in terms of their effects in practice (their substantive results),
not simply on the basis of their use of lfonnal) gender neutral language.
B. The Public/ Private Dichotomy
Particularly because of diminishing governmental resources for legal aid
services in Canada in recent years, there has been a trend in the
allocation of funds to recognize a priority for legal aid services for
accused persons charged with criminal offences. Such a priority for
legal aid services in criminal law matters has been defended on the basis
of philosophical arguments about the need to ensure adequate
representation for an individual accused, having regard to the
seriousness of such matters and the (theoretically) unlimited resources
of the State in adversarial proceedings. However, these philosophical
arguments need to be carefully scrutinized, particularly since they
result in disproportionate funding for legal aid services in criminal
law matters (the 'public'), thereby diminishing resources available for
family law (the 'private'). Thus, the preference for legal aid services in
criminal law matters may reaffirm the disadvantages for women of the
public/private dichotomy. 39 Historically, the need to provide indigent
accused with representation in criminal law matters was never the sole
justification for the introduction of provincial legal aid programmes in
Canada in the 1960s and 1970s. The report recommending the creation
of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan in 1965, for example, expressed the view
that there was no reason to exclude family law matters from legal aid

entitlement: 'In the contemplation of the law of Ontario, [criminal law
and family law matters] are equal . . . Any legal aid system which intends
to ensure the advancement of the protection of the legal rights of the
needy must surely include matrimonial causes'.40 Thus, although the
factual basis for these assertions is unclear (what information was
available about the needs of poor women for legal aid services, by
contrast with the needs of poor men?), governmental policy about legal
aid services recognized at the outset a commitment to family law
services for legal aid clients, as well as in relation to those charged
with criminal offences. Significantly, this early commitment has been
eroded, not by policy changes per se, but rather by the demands of
'fiscal federalism' in Canada. Thus, the preference for legal aid
services in criminal law matters has resulted from the preferential
federal funding available for criminal law services, a subject within the
jurisdiction of the federal government.41 In this context, it is arguable
that the current emphasis on legal aid services in criminal law
matters results more directly from the realities of federal- provincial
relations to a much greater extent than from philosophical values.
Moreover, closer scrutiny of the claim that the current priority for
legal aid services in criminal law matters is fully justified in terms of
important philosophical values also reveals some difficulties from the
perspective of gender equality goals. The justification for disproportionate legal aid resources being allocated to those charged with criminal

offences is that an accused person faces a disparity of legal resources
where the state is the other party in adversarial proceedings, and that
the possible consequences of the proceedings are severe, including
imprisonment. These claims are, of course, important; the issue is
whether their impact is gender neutral.
In relation to the first claim, that the accused faces a disparity of
resources, it is important to note that legal aid services accord priority
to persons accused of criminal offences even though claimants in other
legal proceedings may also face the disparity of the State's resources:
for example, psychiatric patients in commital proceedings, refugee
claimants in status hearings, and parents in child protection proceedings.
In each of these cases, parties face the disparity of resources of the
State, and they face similarly severe consequences, including loss of
liberty in the form of indeterminate commital for psychiatric patients,
deportation for refugee claimants, and loss of liberty for children
removed from the care of their parents. Thus, for these claimants, as for
accused persons, there are both disparities of resources and serious
consequences. Yet, the priority for legal aid services accorded to indigent
accused does not extend to legal aid services in these other situations
so easily.
Such an analysis permits us to probe more deeply the neutrality of a
legal aid system which accords priority to those accused of criminal
offences,

disproportionately

men

in

Canadian

society,

while

simultaneously limiting claims by psychiatric patients, refugees, or
parents, at least half of whom (or more) may be women. Such a
conclusion might at least suggest a need to extend legal aid services to
all those involved

in legal proceedings in which the State is a party (and there is a consequential disparity of resources) and where the consequences are
serious for the individual litigant in terms of loss of liberty or
livelihood. Even more significantly, such an analysis suggests a need
to examine the underlying values attached to the consequences of
criminal law and family law matters: what are the unstated values of
a society which regards the consequences of possible imprisonment for
an accused charged with a property offence as more significant than
the loss of custody of one's children in protection proceedings? Is the
law's traditional division between public and private masking a
gendered allocation of legal aid funding?
Moreover, from the perspective of family law disputes, the law's
recognition of the need for legal aid services for those accused of criminal
offences, on the basis of the disparity of legal resources of the accused
and the State, suggests a need for legal aid programmes to take more
seriously the disparity of resources of many women, by contrast with
their male partners,

in family law disputes. Why do legal aid

programmes readily accept the arguments about the disparity of

resources (between an accused person and the State) as the basis for
defining entitlement for criminal legal aid services, but systematically
deny the significance of such disparities in the context of legal aid
services in family law? In thinking about this issue, moreover, it is
important to consider whether the disparity of resources in the criminal
justice con- text is as real in practice as in theory especially in a context
where court congestion, backlogs of cases, and overworked court
officials (including prosecutors) may not be as formidable in reality as
the philosophical justification suggests. By contrast, a woman in a
family law dispute may have to face her affluent husband's well-prepared
and well-paid private practice lawyer. Such an analysis suggests that
women in family law cases may have needs which, in practice, are
just as great in terms of disparate levels of resources as those of men
accused of criminal offences. Even in the context of the criminal justice
system, data suggests a lack of equality for men and women in
terms of access to legal aid services because women may commit
different crimes, by contrast with men,42 and because they may be
treated somewhat differently by the criminal justice system.43 Thus,
even women accused of criminal offences may not benefit from the
priority accorded to criminal law matters by legal aid services, at least
not to the same extent as men. Moreover, in the context of widespread
male violence in Canadian society, gender inequality is reinforced by
the priority accorded to legal aid representation for those accused of

criminal offences (including assault), rather than for those who are
the victims of violence. Since most accused persons are men and
their victims are, most often, women, violence in the 'private' sphere
results in legal aid representation for those who must answer in the
'public' sphere, while women's

claims for representation

(and

protection) remain 'private'. Such an outcome suggests the law's
complicity in the public/private dichotomy, a dichotomy which also
reinforces differential and gendered power relationships in the family.

C. Equality
North

American

jurisprudence

about

entrenched

constitutional

guarantees of sex equality have been dominated until recently by
ideas of sameness and difference in relation to men and women.
According to some American theorists, women's claims to enjoy
benefits and advantages traditionally enjoyed by men depend on
assertions that women are similarly situated to men (at least in all
relevant respects).44 By contrast, others have asserted that equality
claims must take account of differences between women and men,
differences such as those associated with reproduction (and perhaps
some aspects of family roles) which mandate differing needs for
women, by contrast with men.45 Yet, as has been noted, the problem of
an approach to equality which focuses on either sameness or difference
is that they both reinforce men as the standard to which women are
compared. Thus, whether women are regarded as the same as men, or

different from them, the standard of comparison is gendered.
Especially after the entrenchment of constitutional guarantees of sex
equality in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Supreme
Court jurisprudence in Canada has adopted approaches to equality
analysis which recognize the limits of 'sameness' equality, and thus
take account of issues of power differentials and relative disadvantage
for defined groups in Canadian society. For purposes of this analysis
of entitlement to legal aid services, the decisions of the Canadian
Supreme Court are important in two ways.

One is the Court's

acceptance of a general approach to equality analysis which focuses
on substantive outcomes for equality analysis and not just formal ideas
about equality. In decisions of the Court about the systemic nature of
pregnancy dis- crimination (Brooks v Canada Sofeway Ltd) 46 and in
relation to sexual harassment of women in employment Uanzen v Plary
Enterprises Ltd),47 for example, the Court accepted concepts of equality
and discrimination which recognized gendered societal arrangements and
the ways in which they created disadvantages for women. Similarly, in
Action Travail des Femmes v CNR,48 the Court recognized the idea of
systemic inequality on the basis of sex in a claim which challenged
the expectations of men and women about 'non-traditional' work; and
which mandated affirmative action remedies. Moreover, in R v
Lavallee,49 the Court took into account expressly the differences in a
woman's experiences of violence in intimate relationships in recognizing

the need for expert evidence to establish her sense of 'harm' in relation to
the traditional view of the defence of self-defence. Cases such as these
arguably demonstrate that Canadian courts have increasingly taken
(some) account of the impact of gendered experiences in their equality
analyses, especially in the interpretation of Charter guarantees. In this
way, there is Supreme Court of Canada authority for an interpretation
of equality which goes beyond formal equality guarantees to recognize
more substantive needs to accomplish gender equality in practice.
The approach in these decisions is consistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in Andrews, where the Court eschewed a 'sameness'
approach for one which recognized the need to take account of the idea
of relative 'disadvantage' within Canadian society. In such a context,
the substantive inequality of legal aid services which fail to respond
to women's needs as well as those of men may be inconsistent with
constitutionally entrenched equality guarantees. In this way, the Court's
language about equality as disadvantage may also arguably confine both
federal and provincial legislative choices about entitlement to legal aid
services in Canada, particularly where they fail to accord substantive
equality on the basis of gender. In the context of Andrews, legal aid
services must take account of substantive disadvantages for women, not
merely whether women are similarly situated in relation to men with
respect to gender neutral services.
Thus, both the Andrews decision and others relating to sex equality

guarantees mandate legal aid services for men and women without discrimination. In this way, legal aid programmes must be assessed, not
in terms of the gender-neutral language they use to describe entitlement
to legal aid services, but in relation to the substantive outcome of the
application of their criteria. Thus, the gender equality objectives of legal
aid programmes must be tested in terms of outcomes and results, not
just aspirations.

4.

R E-V ISI O N I N G A C C ESS T O J USTICE FO R W O M E N

Effective strategies for gender equality require a re-assessment of ends as well
as means. The paradigmatic liberal prescription equal opportunity is a
necessary but never sufficient social objective. The ultimate goal is not simply
to ensure women's full participation in organizations that wield social,
economic, and political power; it is rather to change the nature of those
organizations and the way power is distributed and exercised. Our priority
should be to empower women as well as men to reshape the institutions that
are shaping them. At issue is not simply equality between the sexes, but the
quality of life for both of them.50

Rhode's assertion captures the difference between an analysis of
gender equality in our current legal aid arrangements and visions of
access to justice which promote substantive equality for men and women
in the legal process. In her view, for example, such re-assessment means
that concerns about individual intent in legal analysis should be

replaced

by a focus on institutional practices

in relation

to

discrimination; thus, she has suggested that 'the law's approach to
rape, sexual harassment and domestic violence must reach beyond the
relatively rare circumstances in which an individual plaintiff comes
forward with conclusive proof of injury' to one which focuses 'more
critically on the cultural conditions that foster sexual abuse and on the
law-enforcement practices that discourage redress'.51 Such restructuring
might need to take seriously the identification of what legal aid services
are appropriate for the victims of family violence (more often women
and children) and how services should be organized to be most
effective in meeting their needs. Thus, focusing our attention on legal
aid services as an institutional resource for achieving equality, we may
need to rethink the provision of legal aid services in family law
matters, the need for student legal aid clinics which offer services to
battered women but not to male batterers, and the appropriateness of a
legal aid clinic providing services to women in family law matters. In
each case, the real question is the extent to which such services
contribute to institutional objectives of substantive equality. Or, as
Rhode suggested, 'by broadening our aspirations to justice, we may
come closer to attaining it'.52
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'fundamental change'. See Task Force report, above n I, at 9. In addition, the Task Force explained
its goal of fundamental change in terms of the increasing diversity of Canadian society:
'The Task Force has taken as its starting point the rhetorical question: should the legal profession
continue to be a white male elitist institution or should it reflect the diversity of Canada? It is
clear that the profession must become more representative of Canadian society. Women have
gained entry to the profession in increasingly large numbers, but their entry has been marked by
struggle rather than enthusiasm. This cold reception is accentuated for Women of Colour,
Aboriginal women, women with disabilities and lesbians. True access to the profession will
require a transformation in the profession itself'.
See Task Force report, above n I, at 23.
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See Task Force report, chs 4-10 and 12-13.

• The report reviewed constitutional and statutory protections against discrimination, and the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada interpreting these provisions, along with remedial
actions. The report stated bluntly:
'The Task Force accepts as a basic premise that men and women should have an equal opportunity
to enter and progress in the profession. It views discrimination on the basis of gender as equally
repugnant to discrimination on the basis of race or religion. There is nothing controversial about
this assertion. It is the law and must form part of the framework for change in the legal profession.'
(emphasis added)
Task Force report, above n I, at 11-12.
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Task Force report, above n !,"at 17-19.
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See Task Force report, above n I, at ch. I I.
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Task Force report, above n I, at 205.
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Michael Freeman, 'Towards a Critical Theory of Family Law' (1985) 38 Current Legal Problems

153, at 155. See also Pamela Symes, 'Property, Power and Dependence: Critical Family Law' (1987)
14Journal

of Law and Society 1299; and Nikolas Rose, 'Beyond the Public/Private Division: Law,

power and the Family' (1987) 14Joumal of Law and Society 61.
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The Legal Aid Committee in Ontario reported in the Fall of 1993, for example, on projected

shortfalls in legal aid funding and suggested measures for meeting these shortfalls. The suggestions
included increasing the levies on members of the legal profession (now set at $292 per year for
those who do not participate in providing legal aid services); and amending the Law Society Act
so as to require lawyers who control mixed trust accounts at the major banks to set up a joint
mixed trust account with the Law Foundation of Ontario so that the funds could be invested at
higher rates of return. These proposals and others were outlined in some detail in an interview
with the Chair of the Law Society's Legal Aid Committee, Ms Fran Kiteley, reported in the Law
Times (7 November 1993) at 7.
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See Legal Action Group, A Strategy for Justice (1992) at ch. 3. According to the author, 'although

the number of matrimonial and family cases has grown over the last decade, these take up a
decreasing proportion of civil legal aid certificates'. Ibid., at 33.
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Task Force report, above n l, at 208.
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The Task Force report quoted with approval the comments of L'Heureux-Dube J in the

decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Mage v Mage (1992), 99 DLR (4th) 456, at 498 (quoting
an earlier decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal), affirming the need to treat family law cases
more equitably by comparison with other kinds of litigation:
'[S]o often the evidence [in family matters] is incomplete owing to the ignorance or incompetence
of counsel or the inexperience or unreasonable expectations of the client! Or the evidence is cut
short so as not to prolong the discussion (or make the judge impatient) when there is already an
overloaded list of such cases to be heard! Or the evidence is truncated owing to a lack of interest
or a failure to understand its full meaning!
It is significant that this type of carelessness occurs much less often in the fields of contract,
insurance or tort, which are classified as 'civil law' as distinct from 'family law', yet the law should
not be prepared to accept half-measures in either case. The outcome of a family law proceeding is certainly
more dramatic. Lack of income is felt daily, and may affect the children's entire lives, aside from often working
to the detriment of the person who though with adequate resources, deprives his family of what they need.
This, in my view, had to be said since such deficiencies are so often encountered in the entering
of evidence in family law cases'.
See Task Force report, above n 1, at 212. For an interesting analysis of the family law decisions
of L'Heureux-Dube J, see also Marlene Cano, 'Claire L'Heureux-Dube et le droit de la famille:
Juge innovateur? ... Innovatrice' (1991) 12 Queen's Quarterly 131.
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Although the report did not identify differences among different provincial legal aid schemes, it

did confirm that fewer concerns were expressed in Quebec, a province which utilizes primarily a
'staff lawyer' model for delivering legal aid services. For some information about the cost of legal aid
services in family law cases in Quebec some years ago, see Ministere de la Justice du Quebec,
'Evaluation of Legal Aid' (1983) and see M. J. Mossman, 'Toward a Comprehensive Legal Aid
Program in Canada: Exploring the Issues' (1993) 4 Windsor Journal

of Legal and Social Issues 1.

The report's positive comments about mediation and negotiation do not clearly reflect the
continuing controversy in Canada about the appropriate use of alternate dispute resolution in
family law. Just as in the United Kingdom, the use of mediation in family law has received serious
criticism in Canada. For example, see (for the United Kingdom) Anne Bottomley, 'What is

Happening to Family Law? A Feminist Critique of Conciliation' in Julia Brophy and Carol Smart
(eds), Women-in- Law: Explorations in Law, Family and Sexuality (Routledge and Kegan Paul:
1985) at 162; and (for Canada) Martha Shaffer, 'Divorce Mediation: A Feminist Perspective' (1989) 46
University of Toronto Law Review 162; and Martha Bailey 'Unpacking the "Rational Alternative" :
A Critical Review of Family Mediation Movement Claims' (1989) 8 Canadian Journal of Family Law
61.
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Task Force report, above n 1, at 208-9, quoting from a submission received by the Task Force.
See Task Force report, above n l, at 213: Recommendation 11.3. The Task Force's

recommendation reinforced an earlier recommendation of the Federal/Provincial/Territorial
Working Group Report on Gender Bias in the Justice System. See also The Law Society of British
Columbia, Gender Equality in the Justice System (The Law Society of British Columbia Gender Bias
Committee: 1992).
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In Andrews v Law Society

of British Columbia [1989] l SCR 143, the Supreme Court of Canada

established the approach to interpreting the guarantees of equality in section 15 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms; according to the Task Force report, the approach in Andrews
should be understood as a 'purposive' one, focusing on the redress of disadvantaged groups in
society, having regard to the social, political and economic conditions. Thus, the Task Force
concluded that 'the conte.xtual approach was the "kiss of death" to the concept of formal equality'.
Task Force report, above n 1, at 13.

° For an excellent comparison of Canadian and American jurisprudence on equality, see Lynn
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See Jennie Abell, 'Women, Violence and the Criminal Law: "It's the Fundamentals of Being

a Lawyer that are at Stake Here"' (1992) 17 Queen's Law journal 147.
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The availability of legal aid services in different fora is one of the interesting features of

Ontario's 'mixed' delivery system for legal aid services. Although the legal aid programme in
Ontario relies primarily on the issuance of 'certificates' to members of the private Bar for legal aid
services (as defined by the legislation and policies developed by the Ontario Legal Aid Plan),
lawyers are also designated to provide 'duty counsel' services in some matters in designated courts;
and there are over seventy community legal aid clinics with a mandate to provide legal aid services,
primarily in areas other than criminal legal aid services and family law. There are also 'hybrid'
student legal aid services in which law students at Ontario's six law schools offer legal aid services
similar to those offered by the community legal aid clinics, but also limited services in the areas
of family and criminal law. For further details about the 'mixed' system, see Mossman, above n
16 and Lightman and Mossman, 'Salary or Fee-for-Service in Delivering Legal Aid

Services:

Theory and Practice in Canada' (1984) 10 Queen's Law Journal 109. The history of legal aid in
Canada is explored in Dieter Hoehne, Legal Aid in Canada (Edwin Mellen Press: 1989); for the
history of legal aid in Ontario, see Mary Pat Reilly, 'The Origins and Development of Legal Aid
in Ontario' (1988) 8 Windsor Yearbok of Access to Justice 81.
The conclusion that male clients charged with battering were not being denied legal advice and
representation is supported by a letter from Dean Donald McRae, Dean of the law school at the

University of Ottawa, to the local newspaper, the Ottawa Citizen, stating that the students' arrangements for providing legal aid services to women victims of violence, but not to male batterers, was
consistent with the law of discrimination in Ontario:
'It is difficult to understand the vehement and at times almost hysterical attack made on this
policy. Its practical effect is that a very small number of men who in the past might have been
represented by students will now be represented by practising lawyers, and a significant number
of women who have no alternative legal support will now receive representation. This is not
discrimination. There is no denial of the right of any accused to the best possible defence available.
There is no prejudging of the guilt of men charged with assault against women.
Acting on the conviction that violence against women is a serious problem, the Student Legal
Aid Society is, in accordance with its mandate and in the best tradition of community legal aid
programs in the province, seeking to make provision for a particular group whose needs are not
adequately served by the existing system'.
See Abell, above n 21, at fn 14.
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See Abell, above n 21, at 150. For details of the complaint correspondence, see M.J. Mossman,

'"Shoulder to Shoulder": Gender and Access to Justice' (1990) 10 Windsor Yearbook

of Access to

Justice 351, at 360 ff.
The complaint to the Law Society alleged that the policy adopted by the student legal aid
clinic violated 'the most sacred principles on which our justice system is based' and constituted
discrimination on the basis of sex. According to Christine Boyle, the response of the Ottawa
criminal defence Bar placed legal aid clinics in the position of having to explain (again!) 'that
services which are tailored to women's needs only break one rule, the rule that the world must be
organised to suit the needs of men'. See Christine Boyle, 'Commentary' (1990) 10 Windsor Yearbook

of Access to justice 376, at 379.
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According to one lawyer opposed to the proposed women-only clinic, 'this is not a clinic that

is devoted to women who are victims of physical or sexual assault' and 'a strong case could be
made for it if it were offering services particular to women'. Such comments suggest acceptance of
the idea of women-only services in principle, so long as they clearly relate to issues which are
regarded as sex-specific. It is interesting that family law services for women, especially in the
conte.xt of domestic violence, are not regarded as within this category. For further details, see DarylLynn Carlson, 'LSUC Turns Down "Discriminatory" Women's Clinic' (Law Times: 12 December
1993) at 5. See also the bluntly critical views of a feminist journalist about this decision: Michelle
Landsberg, 'Lopsided Legal System Denies Justice to Wives' ( Toronto Star, 14 January 1994 and
15January 1994).
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Most recently, the student legal aid clinic at Osgoode Hall Law School has become embroiled in

these issues in relation to its policy of representing women involved in domestic violence, and
not males accused of battering. See Osgoode Hall Law School, Obiter Dicta (17 January 1994) at
I.News reports have also indicated that the Government has not abandoned interest in a
women- only legal aid clinic; according to a recent report, the Attorney-General Marion Boyd
recently told the Law Society that 'she hopes that a law clinic that would exclude men but
focus entirely on the varied needs of female family law consumers can be developed for the
province'. As she spoke, 'about 30 divorced or separated mothers marched and chanted outside

Osgoode Hall ...' Toronto Star (30 January 1994) at A4.
Lynn Smith has suggested that the issue in such cases is not really the needs oflegal aid
clients, but rather the 'backlash' against legal gains made by women as they have become a
critical mass in law schools and in the legal profession in Canada in the past two decades. Inthe
Ottawa student clinic situation, she suggested that one could observe 'one of the classic features
of backlash the waving of banners with slogans that have very little to do with the issues at
stake'. See Lynn Smith, 'Commentary' (1990) 10 Windsor Yearbook of Access to justice 382, at 383.
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Abell, above n 21 at 152-3. See also the Dean's letter to the press, above n 22.
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Abell, above n 21, at 154. See, for example, Linda MacLeod, Battered but not Beaten .

..Preventing Wife Battering in Canada (Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women:
1987); Mary-Lou Fassel, 'Wife Assault and the Criminal Justice System: Can Women Find
Fairness in a System Built for Men?' (1990) 8 Vrs-a-Vrs #1, l; Laura Crites, 'A Judicial Guide
to Understanding Wife Abuse' (1985) 24 Judges journal 5; and Education Wife Assault,
'Violence in Canadian Society' (1987) 7 juristat #2, 13.
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Abell, above n 21, at 154. In the hearing before the Law Society, the Women's Legal

Education and Action Fund presented a brief, arguing that effective legal aid services for
battered women required the adoption of a policy, such as that of the Ottawa student legal
aid clinic, which recognized both their special needs and the necessary design of legal services
responsive to their needs:
'[The policy] provides a service that is not otherwise available to a disadvantaged group
without in any way jeopardizing the relatively significant societal resources already currently
available to those accused of such violence. The clinic would be limited in its ability to
accomplish its equality-promoting objectives if it did represent such male accuseds. It would be
forced to reject particular women as clients because of individual cases of conflict of interest. It
would not be able to dedicate its resources to developing a more comprehensive consistent service
to a disadvantaged group. It would risk undermining that service by the temptation to put forward
the type of defence to charges that feeds into myths about violence, frequently made part of a
'complete' defence'.
See letter of support filed by Helena Orton on behalf of the Women's Legal Education and
Action Fund (LEAF), 22 November 1990, at 2; as quoted in Mossman, above n 23, at 362.
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Press: 1989) at 82. For another critique of justice and the family, see Susan Moller Okin, justice,
Gender
and the Family (Basic Books: 1989).
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Rhode, above n 30, at 321. In the American context, Lynne Hecht Schafran has suggested

that the process of investigating gender bias in the law is a 'transformative experience'. See
Schafran, 'Gender and Justice: Florida and the Nation' (1990) 42 Florida Law R.eview 181,
especially at 202 ff.
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For a detailed analysis of categorical entitlement, both in relation to mandatory and

discretionary services, and the relationship of categorical entitlement to eligibility guidelines, see
Mossman, above n 16.
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For an interesting discussion about legal categories, see Regina Craycar and Jenny Morgan,

The Hidden Gender of Law (Federation Press: 1990) at 3 ff. As they suggested:
'Legal practitioners have always known that people's lives did not readily fit into legal
categories, but this has not often been reflected in a legal system which fragments its
treatment of people's problems into categories ... For women, these artificial classifications are
especially problematic
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For an overview of research about 'hidden' gender bias in law and legal research, see Lynn
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There is some evidence that legal services are generally utilized more frequently by men than
by women in Canada. In a 1979 study, McKie and Reed concluded that women did not use the
civil courts as frequently as men; see C. McKie and P. Reed, Women in the Civil Courts (Department
of Justice: 1979). Even in the context of criminal courts, women are represented significantly less
often than men; see E. Adelberg, A Forgotten Minority: Women in Conflict with the Law (Can Assoc of
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